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Executive summary
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold the Finnish part of the 
international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the 
Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2013 continued to 
demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK 
remarked on the nuclear safeguards accountancy system and procedures of one of the 
stakeholders in 2013, setting required actions to comply with procedures.
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear 
materials accountancy, control, security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle -related 
activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities 
that use nuclear materials – often referred to as “licence holders” or “operators” – and 
the state authority. A licence holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and 
the state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder 
fulfils the requirements. The control of non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers, to 
ensure the non-proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for 
all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of 
nuclear energy.
Finland has significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there are the 
VTT research reactor in Espoo and a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. 
Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the third reactor under construction at 
the Olkiluoto site are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as 
applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction 
site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
The planning and design of the fourth reactor at the Olkiluoto power plant and at a new 
nuclear power plant site Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, were authorised in 2010. The safeguards 
systems for these new reactors will be designed together with facility design and 
development. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import 
licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the 
technology and sensitive information. The operators have submitted the preliminary Basic 
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Technical Characteristics to the European Commission and obtained Material Balance 
Area codes for the future reactors before the vendor companies were selected. In December 
2013, Fennovoima announced that the Hanhikivi reactor will be supplied by Rusatom 
Overseas. This was not included as option in the application of 2009, and thus the re-
evaluation of the conditions for the old authorisation was initiated.
Uranium production at the Talvivaara mine got approval from government according to 
the nuclear energy legislation in March 2012 as uranium may be economically extracted 
as one of the by-products of nickel, because the bioheapleaching technique developed for 
large nickel deposits makes the extraction of other metals from low grade ore economically 
viable. In 2013, the company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the Supreme 
Administrative Court rescinded the approval owing to claims of environmental and 
economical issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. Currently, 
uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta Nickel Refinery. 
STUK maintains a central national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies 
that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree, European Union legislation and international agreements. These 
tasks are performed to guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international 
community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to 
this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system and the European 
Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been 
reduced significantly due to the state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland, 
which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year 
is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did 
they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2013. By their nuclear 
materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its 
own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards. STUK 
continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the 
global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: 
STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task 
of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and 
to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of 
a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s 
organisation, together with the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and 
able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without getting detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common 
endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
STUK-B 173
5
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2013 was 
focused on nuclear materials control, in particular at the back end of the fuel cycle. This 
was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the final disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site. The application for the licence for the 
disposal facility, which consists of the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, 
was submitted to the government in December 2012. In addition, STUK contributed 
to educational workshops and training courses for authorities who represent nuclear 
newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in co-operation 
with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year border 
monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers training and the 
updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures.
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Nuclear non-proliferation is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials and nuclear en-
ergy globally. In order for Finland to have a nuclear 
industry, most of which consists of nuclear energy 
production, it must be ensured that nuclear mate-
rials, equipment, and technology are used only for 
their declared peaceful purposes. The basis for nu-
clear safeguards is the national system for the reg-
ulatory control of nuclear materials and activities. 
Nuclear safeguards are an integral part of nuclear 
safety and nuclear security and are applied both 
to large- and medium-size nuclear industry and to 
small-scale nuclear material activities. Along with 
the safeguards, the regulatory process for nuclear 
non-proliferation includes transport control, ex-
port control, border control, international coopera-
tion and conventions, and monitoring compliance 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT).
In Finland, STUK is the competent author-
ity regarding the implementation of nuclear non-
proliferation. On 30 November 2012, a new STUK 
strategy for the period 2013–2017 was announced, 
and the organisation was renewed to support the 
implementation of the new strategy. The new strat-
egy will not affect much the mandatory implemen-
tation of non-proliferation control at STUK, but it 
gives a good framework for the interaction between 
nuclear safety, security and safeguards. In paral-
lel to this, STUK regulations were under renewal 
and were finally issued on 1 December 2013. In 
the new STUK safeguards regulation, the require-
ments concerning nuclear material accountancy, 
safeguards procedures and the implementation 
of the Additional Protocol are merged in one up-
dated regulation, the YVL regulatory guide D.1 
Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards. This 
instructs all stakeholders in the Finnish nuclear 
field in how to comply with the current national 
and international safeguards regulations. The new 
regulations will be implemented in 2014.
1.1 International safeguards 
agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both of these 
treaties, and also has several bilateral agreements 
in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
When Finland joined the EU, the bilateral agree-
ments with Australia, Canada and the USA were 
partly substituted with the corresponding Euratom 
agreements (see Appendix 3 for the relevant legis-
lation).
Finland was the first state where an 
INFCIRC1/153-type comprehensive nuclear Safe-
guards Agreement with the IAEA entered into 
force (INFCIRC/155, 10 February 1972). When 
Finland joined the EU (1 January 1995), this 
agreement was suspended and subsequently the 
Safeguards Agreement between the non-nuclear 
weapon Member States of the EU, the Euratom, 
and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force 
in Finland on 1 October 1995. Finland signed the 
Additional Protocol (AP) to the INFCIRC/193 in 
Vienna on 22 September 1998 with the other EU 
Member States, and ratified it on 8 August 2000. 
The Additional Protocol entered into force on 30 
April 2004, once all the EU Member States had 
ratified it. The scope and mandate for Euratom 
nuclear safeguards are defined in the European 
Commission Regulation No. 302/2005.
1 INFCIRC = IAEA Information Circulars
1 Nuclear non-proliferation 
implementation in Finland
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After Finland joined the EU as a Member 
State and therefore joined the Euratom nuclear 
safeguards, a comprehensive national safeguards 
system was still maintained and further developed. 
The basic motivation for this is the responsibil-
ity assumed by Finland for its nuclear safeguards 
and nuclear security under the obligations of the 
NPT, and also to take care of the fulfilment of the 
Euratom requirements.
The national nuclear safeguards derive their 
mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. These were amended dur-
ing 2008 as a result of the general constitution-
based renewal of the Finnish nuclear legislation 
system. The operator’s obligation to have a nu-
clear material accountancy system and the right 
of STUK to oversee the planning and generation 
of design information for new facilities was intro-
duced from STUK regulations to the Decree.
As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues detailed 
regulations on safety, security and safeguards (the 
YVL Guides) that apply to the use of nuclear en-
ergy. STUK’s safeguards requirements for all users 
of nuclear energy in all phases of the nuclear fuel 
cycle are set in YVL Guide D.1 Regulatory Control 
of Nuclear Safeguards. Areas covered include the 
obligations and measures stemming from the 
Additional Protocol for the Safeguards Agreement 
and recent developments. All stakeholders have 
to describe their own safeguards system in writ-
ten form (as a nuclear materials handbook or 
safeguards manual) to ease their task of fulfilling 
their obligations and to guarantee the effective and 
comprehensive function of the national safeguards 
system. In the new guide, there are also specific na-
tional requirements for the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel in a geological repository. 
The new YVL Guide D.1 Regulatory Control 
of Nuclear Safeguards entered into force in 
1  December 2013. Nuclear materials control ap-
plies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual-use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and technology suitable 
for producing nuclear energy or nuclear weap-
ons as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence
•	 R&D	and	other	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	
fuel cycle as defined in the Additional Protocol
•	 design	 and	 construction	 of	 new	 nuclear	 facili-
ties.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system are the authorities and the li-
cence holders. Undistributed responsibility for the 
safety, security and safeguards of the use of nucle-
ar energy is on the licence holder. It is the responsi-
bility of STUK as the competent state authority to 
ensure that the licence holders comply with the re-
quirements of the law and the nuclear safeguards 
agreements. To complement the national effort, 
international control is necessary to demonstrate 
credibility and the proper functioning of the na-
tional safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsi-
ble for national non-proliferation policy and inter-
national agreements. The MFA is responsible for 
the export licensing of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear dual-use items including sensitive nuclear 
technology. The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE) is the highest authority for the 
management and control of nuclear energy. MEE 
is responsible for the legislation related to nuclear 
energy and it is also the competent authority men-
tioned in the Euratom Treaty. Also other minis-
tries, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Defence contribute to the efficient func-
tioning of the national nuclear safeguards system.
1.2.2 STUK
As per the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK is 
responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates the 
licence holders’ activities and ensures that the 
obligations of international agreements concern-
ing the peaceful use of nuclear materials are met. 
Regulatory control by STUK includes the posses-
sion, use, production, transfer (national and inter-
national), handling, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear dual-use 
items. STUK is in charge of Finland’s approval 
and consultation process for IAEA and European 
Commission inspectors. STUK approves an inspec-
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tor as long as there are no such issues related to 
the person in question that might adversely affect 
nuclear safety or security at Finnish facilities or 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The new 
inspector requests are sent for comments to the op-
erators that hold construction or operating licences 
for nuclear facilities. If STUK cannot approve an 
inspector, it assigns the approval process to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and many other activi-
ties besides. STUK reviews the licence holders’ re-
ports (operational notifications, inventory reports), 
inspects their accountancy, facilities and transport 
arrangements on site, and performs system audits. 
Office work constitutes 90% of the inspection ef-
fort. Most of the working hours are chargeable to 
the users of nuclear energy (see Figure 10 for the 
distribution of the compiled working days). STUK 
runs a verification programme for nuclear activi-
ties to assess the completeness and correctness of 
the declarations by the licence holders. Nuclear 
safeguards on the national level are closely linked 
with other functions of nuclear materials control 
and non-proliferation: licensing, export control, 
border control, transport control, combating il-
licit trafficking, the physical protection of nuclear 
materials, and monitoring compliance with the 
Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
Nuclear safety and particularly nuclear security 
objectives are closely complemented by safeguards 
objectives. Therefore, the research, development 
and regulatory units in the fields of safety, security 
and safeguards at STUK cooperate under the non-
proliferation framework. STUK issued a new strat-
egy and consequently a new matrix organisation 
in 2013. The scope of non-proliferation work of the 
Nuclear Materials Sections is linked with many or-
ganisational units of STUK (Figure 1). In the new 
organisation, the competences in non-proliferation 
control were split into several organisational units. 
Only the core competences were maintained in the 
Nuclear Materials Section of the Nuclear Waste 
and Material Regulation. Consequently, interaction 
and cooperation between the reorganised units had 
to be activated. This is described more precisely in 
Chapter 4 Human Resources Development.
Figure 1. Non-proliferation framework covers most of the operational areas of STUK.
 
 
 
 
 
Implementation of 
non-proliferation 
control 
in Finland 
and internationally 
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1.2.3 Licence holders and other 
users of nuclear energy
The essential parts of the national nuclear safe-
guards system are the licence holders, in nuclear 
terminology often called the operators. They per-
form key functions of the national safeguards sys-
tem: control of the authentic source data of their 
nuclear materials and accountancy of nuclear ma-
terials at the facility level for each of their material 
balance areas (MBA). Each licence holder has to 
operate its safeguards system in accordance with 
its own nuclear materials handbook. The require-
ments of the Additional Protocol are integrated in 
the handbook to facilitate safeguards implementa-
tion at the site including the material balance ar-
eas.  The handbook is a part of the facility’s quality 
system and is reviewed and approved by STUK.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a licence holder as groundwork, 
the European Commission adopts particular safe-
guards provisions (PSP) for that licence holder. 
PSPs are drawn taking into account operational 
and technical constraints and in close consultation 
with both the person or undertaking concerned 
and the relevant member state. Until PSPs are 
adopted, the person or undertaking shall apply 
the general provisions of the Commission regula-
tion No 302/2005. A facility attachment (FA) is 
prepared in cooperation with the IAEA for each 
facility to describe arrangements specific for that 
facility. Status of the regulatory documents for the 
Finnish Material Balance Areas at the end of 2013 
is shown in Infobox. 
99.8% of all nuclear materials in Finland reside 
at the nuclear power plants (NPP). The amounts of 
nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
in 1992–2013 are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
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Figure 2. Uranium accumulation in Finland in 1990–2013.
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Figure 3. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel in Finland in 1990–2013.
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MBA,
location
BTC, 
last upd.
Site (AP), 
founded
PSP, 
in force
FA,
in force
Licence/DiP,
in force (from/until)
SG Manual,
upd. 
WL0V,
Loviisa
31.1.2012 S SF L0V1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 
4.5.1998
No Operation,
LO1 until 31.12.2027
LO2 until 31.12.2030
Yes,
30.11.2012
W0L1,
Olkiluoto
20.12.2012 S SF 0LK1,
8.7.2004
Yes, 
7.6.2007
No Operation,
until 31.12.2018
Yes,
4.12.2012
W0L2,
Olkiluoto
20.12.2012 S SF 0LK1,
8.7.2004
Yes, 
7.6.2007
No Operation,
until 31.12.2018
Yes,
4.12.2012
W0LS,
Olkiluoto
24.9.2013 S SF 0LK1,
8.7.2004
Yes, 
7.6.2007
No Operation,
until 31.12.2018
Yes,
4.12.2012
W0L3,
Olkiluoto
11.4.2013 S SF 0LK1,
8.7.2004
No No Construction,
granted 17.2.2005
Yes,
4.12.2012
W0L4,
Olkiluoto
12.11.2012
(prel. DI)
S SF 0LK1,
8.7.2004
(add. 2013)
No No DiP, 
1.7.2010
No
W0LE,
Olkiluoto
27.6.2013 S SF POS1,
31.3.2010
No No DiP,
1.7.2010 (last upd.)
No
W0LF,
Olkiluoto
27.6.2013 S SF POS1,
31.3.2010
No No DiP,
1.7.2010 (last upd.)
Yes,
29.8.2012
WFV1,
Pyhäjoki
4.7.2013
(prel. DI)
No No No DiP,
1.7.2010
No
WRRF,
Espoo
1.7.2010 S SF VTT1,
8.7.2004
Yes,
9.7.1998
No Operation,
until 31.12.2023
Yes,
31.3.2011
WFRS,
Helsinki
12.4.2013 S SF STUK,
8.7.2004
No No Not required
(for STUK)
No
WHEL,
Helsinki
8.11.2006 S SF HYRL,
8.7.2004
No No Operation,
until 31.12.2017
No
WKK0,
Kokkola
30.5.2013 No No No Operation,
until 31.12.2019
No
WNNH,
Harjavalta
16.11.2010 No No No Operation,
until 31.12.2019
No
WTAL,
Talvivaara
29.11.2010 No No No No No
WDPJ,
Jyväskylä
14.5.2012 No No No Operation,
until 31.12.2014
No
Finnish material balance areas and their status. MBA (material balance code), BTC (Basic Technical 
Characteristics, i.e. Design Information), AP (the Additional Protocol), PSP (Particular Safeguards 
Provisions set by the European Commission), FA (Facility Attachment prepared by the IAEA), DiP 
(Decision-in-Principle, date of Parliament approval, in force 5 years). 
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Fortum (MBA WL0V)
Fortum is a partly state-owned energy company, 
one of the largest in the Nordic countries. Fortum 
operates power plants of several types including 
nuclear.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
Heat is located on the Hästholmen Island in 
Loviisa on the south-east coast of Finland. This 
first NPP to have been built in Finland hosts two 
VVER-440 type power reactor units, with a cur-
rent net electrical output of 496 MW for each of 
the units, Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. Loviisa 1 started 
its electricity production in 1977 and Loviisa 2 in 
1980. These two units share common fresh and 
spent fuel storages and, for nuclear safeguards ac-
countancy purposes, the whole NPP is counted as 
one material balance area (MBA code WL0V). The 
electricity generated by the Loviisa NPP consti-
tutes about 10% of the whole electricity production 
in Finland.
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union/Russian 
Federation. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was 
returned to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation 
until 1996 and since then it has been stored in the 
interim storage due to a change in Finnish nuclear 
legislation, which today forbids, in general, the 
import and export of nuclear waste including spent 
fuel.
The Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOV1), as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol, comprises 
the entire Hästholmen Island and extends to the 
main gate on the mainland. Particular Safeguards 
Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which define the 
European Commission’s nuclear safeguards pro-
cedures for the facility, have been in force since 
1998. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
for the Loviisa NPP.
Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and oper-
ates a nuclear power plant on the Olkiluoto Island 
in Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. The 
Olkiluoto NPP consists of two nuclear power re-
actor units, Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, and an 
interim spent fuel storage. Olkiluoto 1 was con-
nected to the electricity grid in 1978 and Olkiluoto 
2 in 1980. These units have been upgraded to the 
current output of 880 MW. The Olkiluoto NPP con-
tributes about 17% of all electricity production in 
Finland. At the Olkiluoto NPP, there are three 
active material balance areas (MBA codes W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS).
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Spain and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence for 
constructing a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3, 
on 17 February 2005. As a part of the licensing 
process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary 
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was approved by STUK. The construction 
and assembly work of the reactor unit is under 
way. The European Commission has assigned the 
MBA code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3. 
New nuclear facilities were granted by the 
government on 6 May 2010. One of these was the 
Olkiluoto 4 reactor. The selection of the vendor and 
the supply organisation will take place in the near 
future. Although the reactor type has not been 
specified yet, TVO submitted the preliminary basic 
technical characteristics (BTC) in November 2012 
in order to obtain the MBA code W0L4 for future 
correspondence.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLK1), as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol, current-
ly comprises the fenced areas around the reac-
tor units, the spent fuel storage and the stor-
age for low and intermediate level waste as well 
as the Olkiluoto 3 construction site. Particular 
Safeguards Provisions for the Olkiluoto NPP have 
been in force since 2007. The Facility Attachment 
of the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has 
not been prepared for the Olkiluoto NPP.
VTT FiR1 research reactor (MBA WRRF)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located 
at facilities other than nuclear power plants. The 
most significant of those facilities is the VTT re-
search reactor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF), located in 
Otaniemi, Espoo. The research reactor was the first 
nuclear reactor built in Finland at the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT). It reached criti-
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cality on 27 March 1962. On 12 July 2012 the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy and 
VTT announced the plan to close down the reac-
tor and to start the decommissioning process. A 
new building for experimental nuclear research 
will, however, be built at the Espoo premises of 
VTT. Both these decisions will have long-lasting 
effects, due to the need for permits, contracts and 
environmental impact assessment. This also af-
fects safeguards, as the nuclear materials have to 
be kept under the control of competent personnel 
at both facilities.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
VTT FiR1 from 1998. The Facility Attachment of 
the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not 
been prepared for the research reactor.
The VTT FiR1 site (SSFVTT1), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the whole building around the research reactor, 
although there are non-nuclear companies and 
university premises in the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK), mainly materials no longer in 
use and hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK 
was founded in 1958 and has been located at its 
current premises in Roihupelto, Helsinki since 
1994. The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the 
STUK headquarters and the “Central interim 
storage for small-user radioactive waste” at the 
Olkiluoto NPP site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, consists of the 
whole building where STUK’s headquarters are 
located in Helsinki, but non-STUK premises in the 
building are excluded. The storage at Olkiluoto is 
included in the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki, Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of Helsinki (HYRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. HYRL is located at the Kumpula univer-
sity campus in Helsinki.
The HYRL site (SSFHYRL), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, comprises the 
whole building that hosts the laboratory.
Freeport Cobalt Oy (MBA WKK0)
The by-products of the Kokkola Chemicals facil-
ity’s cobalt purification process contain uranium, 
which qualifies these by-products as nuclear mate-
rial. Thus, the Kokkola Chemicals has an operating 
licence to produce, store and handle nuclear mate-
rial.	In	March	2013,	Freeport-McMoRan	Copper	&	
Gold Inc acquired the ownership of the OM Group. 
The operator is Freeport Cobalt Oy, and the facility 
is located in Kokkola on the west coast of Finland.
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta (MBA WNNH)
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy operates the nickel 
refining plant at Harjavalta in western Finland. 
The plant was commissioned in 1959, expanded 
in 1995 and again in 2002. Norilsk Nickel Finland 
became a part of the Russian-based Norilsk Nickel 
as a result of the OM Group’s nickel business ac-
quisition in 2007. The refinery of Norilsk Nickel 
Harjavalta employs a technique of sulphuric acid 
leaching of nickel products. Uranium residuals will 
be extracted from the nickel products from the 
Talvivaara mine. In March 2010, STUK granted a 
licence to extract less than 10 tonnes of uranium 
per year. The Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta company 
submitted the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
to the European Commission in December 2010. 
Other nuclear material holders
There are about ten minor nuclear material hold-
ers in Finland. One of them is an actual mate-
rial balance area: the University of Jyväskylä, 
Department of Physics (JYFL, MBA code WDPJ), 
but in fact the nuclear material at JYFL has 
been derogated and exempted by the European 
Commission and the IAEA. Other minor nuclear 
material holders are members of a Catch-All-MBA 
(CAM), for the purposes of international nuclear 
safeguards. Most of these have depleted uranium 
as radiation shielding material.
New operators 
On 9 February 2010, the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd 
mining company announced its interest in inves-
tigating the recovery of uranium as a separate 
product from its sulphide ore body. The Talvivaara 
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deposits in eastern Finland comprise one of the 
largest known sulphide nickel resources in Europe. 
The bioheapleaching technique developed for the 
deposits makes the extraction of metals from low-
grade ore economically viable. Therefore, in ad-
dition to nickel, zinc, copper and cobalt, uranium 
may also be economically extracted and processed 
at the site. The environmental impact assessment 
was carried out in 2010 and, according to nuclear 
energy legislation, the licence to recover uranium 
was granted by the government in March 2012. 
The Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) was 
submitted to the European Commission in 2010, 
and the MBA code WTAL is assigned to the future 
uranium extraction plant that is constructed as a 
separate part of the mineral processing plant. The 
production of uranium was expected to start during 
2013. However, the claims concerning the uranium 
extraction licence were approved by the Supreme 
Administrative Court on 5 December 2013 and the 
processing of the licence application to extract ura-
nium was returned to the government. 
On 5 October 2011, Fennovoima announced its 
decision to locate its new nuclear power plant on 
the Hanhikivi peninsula at Pyhäjoki on the coast 
of the Bay of Bothnia.  Fennovoima started pre-
paratory works with several vendor candidates. 
In 2011 Fennovoima submitted invitations to ten-
der to Areva and Toshiba and the bids were re-
ceived in January 2012. The preliminary Basic 
Technical Characteristics (BTC) was submitted to 
the European Commission in summer 2013, and 
the MBA code WFV1 was assigned to the future 
material balance area. However, after negotiations 
with the two possible vendors and a new candidate, 
Fennovoima announced on 21 December 2013 that 
the plant supplier will be Rusatom Overseas. The 
construction licence application is expected to be 
submitted within five years of the ratification of 
the Decision-in-Principle in summer 2010. Owing 
to the changes in ownership and reactor type 
described in the ratified application, the reassess-
ment of the Decision-in-Principle started in 2013. 
The Hanhikivi site will be declared stepwise as the 
construction proceeds from a virgin green site to 
the nuclear power plant.
Posiva (MBA W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the fi-
nal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It 
is owned by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been 
excavating an underground rock characterisation 
facility called “Onkalo” at Eurajoki since 2004, and 
thus preparing for the construction of the final 
disposal facility. While neither a nuclear licence 
holder nor a nuclear material holder yet, Posiva 
and its activities are highly relevant to the na-
tional safeguards system because Posiva is seen 
as developing a new type of facility, the geologi-
cal repository, where the nuclear material cannot 
be re-verified once it has been encapsulated and 
emplaced. In the IAEA safeguards approaches, it 
has been suggested that the geological formation 
should be under safeguards during the whole life-
time of the underground facility. Therefore, Posiva 
has been required to develop a non-proliferation 
handbook, such as a nuclear materials handbook, 
to describe its safeguards procedures and reporting 
system already before becoming a nuclear material 
holder. By the end of 2012, Posiva submitted to the 
government an application to construct the final 
disposal facility, which will consist of the encapsu-
lation plant and the geological repository. Based 
on the updated drawings in the application, the 
preliminary BTCs were prepared for both facili-
ties separately and submitted to the Commission 
on 27 June 2013. The MBA codes assigned for the 
future facilities are W0LE for the encapsulation 
plant and W0LF for the geological repository. As 
the geological repository will be under continu-
ous development, it has been suggested that the 
BTC for the underground part will be updated 
annually. However, the Facility Attachments of 
the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 have not 
been prepared for these new facilities. The installa-
tion without nuclear materials but having the two 
BTCs for these future Material Balance Areas con-
stitutes a site according to the Additional Protocol. 
The Posiva site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area 
around the buildings supporting the construction 
of the facilities.
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Other stakeholders
Non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers that 
serve nuclear and other industry are obliged to 
take care that non-proliferation sensitive technol-
ogy does not get into the hands of unauthorised 
actors and thereby contribute to nuclear prolif-
eration. The introduction of the Additional Protocol 
(1996) extended the scope of safeguards to the 
non-proliferation control of nuclear programmes 
and fuel cycle-related activities. Additionally, the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
(April 2004) requires every state to ensure that 
export controls, border controls, material account-
ancy and physical protection are efficiently taken 
care of and calls all states to develop appropriate 
ways to work with and inform industry and the 
public regarding their obligations. The control of 
non-nuclear technology holders and suppliers to 
ensure the non-proliferation and peaceful use of 
sensitive technology and dual-use items is a grow-
ing global challenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards are commonly seen as the 
traditional nuclear material accountancy and re-
porting system, the main stakeholders of which are 
the international, regional and local authorities 
and the operators. In accordance with the extended 
non-proliferation regime and the amendments to 
the Finnish legislation, the companies that have 
activities defined in the Additional Protocol are 
under reporting requirements and export control. 
These stakeholders as users of nuclear energy are 
required for the preparation of nuclear safeguards 
manual and to nominate responsible persons for 
nuclear safeguards arrangements.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom 
safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission nuclear 
safeguards both have their separate mandates to 
operate in Finland. These two international inspec-
torates have agreed on cooperation, which aims to 
reduce undue duplication of effort. 2009 saw the 
introduction of a significant change from the tradi-
tional safeguards procedures in Finland as the im-
plementation of integrated safeguards began on 15 
October 2008. The IAEA has annually drawn con-
clusions confirming its confidence that all nuclear 
activities and materials are accounted for and are 
in peaceful use in Finland.
Integrated safeguards include traditional nu-
clear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and safe-
guards activities in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol, fitted together. While this should not lead 
to an increase in inspections, it should enable the 
IAEA to assure itself of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear activities in a state. In practice, the num-
ber of IAEA routine interim inspections decreases. 
In contrast to this, the IAEA additionally performs 
1–3 unannounced or short-notice inspections per 
year in a state that has a number and type of nu-
clear installations that resemble the situation in 
Finland.
The operators report to the Commission as re-
quired by Commission Safeguards regulation No 
302/2005. It is the Commission’s task to audit the 
licence holders’ accounting and reporting systems. 
Both the Commission and STUK have increased 
preparedness for short-notice and unannounced 
inspections and complementary access (abbrevi-
ated SNUICA). Every weekday, one of STUK’s 
inspectors is prepared to attend a possible IAEA 
inspection. 
The number of IAEA and Euratom routine 
inspections decreased significantly in 2009, as 
defined in the state-level safeguards approach 
for Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 
and 2008. The time difference between the 
unannounced inspections at the two spent fuel 
storages (i.e. 2 hours for Loviisa and 48 hours 
for Olkiluoto) was due to the difference in the 
surveillance at the storages and reasonable 
access time for a STUK inspector. At the trilateral 
meeting (IAEA/EC/STUK) in September 2013, 
STUK was informed that no unannounced 
inspections with only 2 hours notice time would be 
performed in Finland after the beginning of 2014, 
but this has not yet been formally announced by 
the IAEA. STUK continues with annual routines 
with approximately 40 inspections, which enable 
the reduction in the effort of the international 
inspectorates.
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1.4 Verified declarations for 
state evaluations
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and 
activities are the basis for the state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
has been nominated a site representative, as per 
European Commission regulation No 302/2005. 
STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant 
information and then submits the compiled decla-
rations in timely fashion to the Commission and 
the IAEA.
In Finland, there are currently six sites in the 
sense of the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear 
power plant (NPP) sites in Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
respectively, the geological repository site in 
Olkiluoto, and three minor sites: the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT), the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of 
Helsinki (HYRL). STUK reviews and verifies the 
correctness and completeness of the information 
about the sites provided by the stakeholders.
STUK annually reviews the information about 
research and development activities that might be 
eligible for declaration, as well as activities speci-
fied in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. STUK 
maintains the information on general plans related 
to the nuclear fuel cycle for the next 10 years and 
keeps account of the exports of specified equipment 
and non-nuclear materials, as listed in Annex II of 
the Additional Protocol.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a 
state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that nu-
clear materials and activities within the state are 
in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations 
and that there are no undeclared activities. Such 
methods can provide information on the identity 
of the nuclear materials and confirm that licence 
holders’ declarations are correct and complete with 
respect to, for example, the enrichment of uranium, 
the burn-up and the cooling time of nuclear fuel. 
The technical analysis methods in use are non-
destructive assay (NDA), environmental sampling 
and satellite imagery.
STUK employs three NDA methods to verify 
spent nuclear fuel. One method lends itself to rapid 
scanning, as the detector is mounted on the fuel 
transfer machine and the fuel elements can be 
measured from above the fuel pond without moving 
the elements. The other two methods, on the other 
hand, allow confirming with greater confidence the 
correctness of the declared burn-up and the cooling 
time. With the most precise method, the absence 
of a fuel pin or pins from a fuel element can be 
discovered. STUK reports to the Commission and 
the IAEA about the NDA measurement campaigns.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their iden-
tity, source of origin and treatment. Safeguards en-
vironmental samples (ES) are used to investigate 
these traces, which provide further information for 
establishing whether the nuclear activities are in 
accordance with the declarations. In the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system, environmental samples 
are collected as surface swipes. The IAEA may col-
lect independent environmental samples during its 
complementary access type of inspections.
Satellite imagery is applied to verify the site 
declaration in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol. Timely imagery is used to monitor dif-
ferent kinds of activities at the sites or elsewhere 
in Finland. STUK contributes to the work of the 
IAEA regular inspections:
Facilities at nuclear power plants (NPP):
•	 Physical	Inventory	Verification	(PIV)	/	Design	
Information	Verification	(DIV)	1/year
•	 Random	Interim	Inspection	(RII)	at	24	h	 
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Spent fuel storages at NPPs
•	 PIV/DIV	1/year
•	 RII	at	2h	i.e.	Unannounced	Inspection	
(UI)/48 h	notification	(at	least	1/year)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities 
(LOF)
•	 PIV/DIV	1/4–6	years
New reactors, under construction
•	 DIV	and	PIV	later	like	at	the	NPPs
Repository (Onkalo), under construction
•	 PIV/DIV	most	likely	as	at	spent	fuel	storages 
Complementary	accesses	at	2/24	h	notification	to	
verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
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satellite image analysts of the IAEA and the 
Commission.
1.5 Licensing and export/import 
control of dual-use goods
As per the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, in ad-
dition to nuclear materials other nuclear fuel 
cycle-related activities are also under regulatory 
control. A licence is required for the possession, 
transfer and import of non-nuclear materials, 
components, equipment and technology suitable 
for producing nuclear energy (nuclear dual-use 
items). The list of these other items is based on 
the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Guidelines 
(INFCIRC/254 Part 1). The licensing authority is 
STUK. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsi-
ble for granting NSG Government-to-Government 
Assurances (GTGA) when necessary. The ministry 
usually consults with STUK before giving the as-
surances. The licence holder is required to provide 
STUK with a list of the above-mentioned items an-
nually. Moreover, the export, import and transfer of 
such items must be reported to STUK.
Mining and mineral processing operations that 
aim to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
nuclear safeguards and regulatory nuclear safety 
control. In order to carry out these activities, a 
national licence and an accounting system to keep 
track of the amounts of uranium and thorium are 
required. A national licence is also required to ex-
port and import uranium or thorium ore and ore 
concentrates. These activities are also controlled 
by the Euratom Supply Agency and the European 
Commission. Mining and milling activities and 
production of uranium and thorium must be re-
ported to STUK, the Commission and the IAEA. 
Finland’s export control system is based on EU 
Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5  May 
2009, which sets up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit 
of dual-use items. The export of Nuclear Suppliers’ 
Group (NSG) Part 1 and Part 2 items is regulated 
by the Finnish Act on the Control of Exports of 
Dual-use Goods. An authorisation is required to 
export dual-use items outside the European Union 
and also for EU internal transfers of NSG Part 1 
items, excluding non-sensitive nuclear materials. 
The licensing authority is the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. Before granting an export license, it takes 
also care of NSG Government-to-Government 
Assurances. The ministry asks STUK’s opinion on 
all applications concerning NSG Part 1 items.
1.6 The regulatory control of transport 
covers nuclear materials
The requirements for the transport of radioactive 
material are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements 
are based on the IAEA safety standard Regulations 
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 
SSR-6, and their purpose is to protect people, the 
environment and property from the harmful effects 
of radiation during the transport of radioactive 
material. Based on these regulations, STUK is the 
competent national authority for the regulatory 
control regarding the transport of radioactive ma-
terial.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material and nuclear waste: generally a licence 
granted by STUK is needed for such a transport. 
Usually the transport licences are granted for a 
fixed period, typically for a few years. A transport 
plan and a transport security plan approved by 
STUK are mandatory for each transport of nuclear 
material or nuclear waste. A certificate of nuclear 
liability insurance must also be delivered to STUK 
before transportation. Furthermore, a package 
may be used for the transport of fissile nuclear 
material only after the package design has been 
approved by STUK.
1.7 STUK’s contribution to international 
safeguards development
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an in-
ternational domain. STUK therefore actively par-
ticipates in international nuclear safeguards-relat-
ed cooperation and development efforts. The prac-
tices obtained at the current construction projects 
in Olkiluoto have emphasised the need to bring in 
the safeguards requirements at an early stage of 
facility design. In order to improve and facilitate 
the future implementation of safeguards at new 
facilities, STUK joined the Safeguards by Design 
Support Programme of the IAEA and initiated ne-
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gotiations with all stakeholders to have the 3-S 
(safety, security, safeguards) concept included in 
the design requirements of new facilities. The ex-
perience has been shared with the IAEA, several 
international fora and also in bilateral co-opera-
tion with several countries.
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and in several working groups.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts 
have contributed to the IAEA’s international mis-
sions. The current experience obtained from the 
planning, design and construction of new nuclear 
facilities in Finland has increased the number of 
requests to participate in different kinds of inter-
national co-operation. 
STUK keeps close contacts with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geologi-
cal repositories is deepening cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden.
The Finnish Safeguards Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards, FINSP, was established 
in 1988. The aim of FINSP is to provide the IAEA 
with educational and technical support in the field 
of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. FINSP is 
funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and im-
plemented by STUK.
1.8 The Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear test explosions in 
any environment. This ban is aimed at constrain-
ing the development and the qualitative improve-
ment of nuclear weapons, including the develop-
ment of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New York on 24 September 1996. It will en-
ter into force after it has been ratified by the 44 
states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states par-
ticipated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or 
research reactors. 
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. 
The verification regime consists of the following 
elements: the International Monitoring System 
(IMS), a consultation and clarification process, on-
site inspections and confidence-building measures. 
The IMS is almost 90% ready, and is providing 
data from almost 300 measuring stations all over 
the world to more than 1200 organisations in more 
than 120 countries. In addition to monitoring com-
pliance with the treaty, the data from IMS is used 
in disaster mitigation. The CTBTO is actively pro-
viding data to the global Tsunami Warning System 
and, since 2012, the CTBTO has been a member of 
the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and 
Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE) and a co-sponsor 
of the Joint Radiation Emergency Management 
Plan of the International Organisations (JPLAN) 
led by the IAEA. Within this framework, the 
CTBTO is responsible for gathering and providing 
close to real-time radionuclide monitoring data to 
the IAEA and other participating organisations. 
Finland signed the CTBT on its day of opening 
in 1996 and ratified it less than three years later. 
In addition to complying with the basic require-
ment of the CTBT of not carrying out any nuclear 
weapons tests, Finland actively takes part in the 
development of the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national 
authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK 
has two roles: it operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the 16 radionu-
clide laboratories in the IMS (RL07). The most im-
portant task of FiNDC is to inspect data received 
from the IMS and inform the national authority 
about any indications of a nuclear test explosion. 
The radionuclide laboratory contributes to the IMS 
by providing support in the radionuclide analyses 
and in the quality control of the radionuclide sta-
tion network. The third major national collaborator 
is the Institute of Seismology at the University of 
Helsinki, which runs an IMS seismology station 
(PS17 in Lahti), and provides analysis of waveform 
IMS data (Figure 4).
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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) Status (31 December 2013)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 183
•	 Total	Ratifications	 161
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 36
1.9 Nuclear safeguards and security 
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of nuclear and radiological safety, security 
and safeguards. All these three regimes have a 
common goal: the protection of people, the society, 
the environment and future generations from the 
harmful effects of ionising radiation. As nuclear 
security aims to protect nuclear facilities, nuclear 
material and other radioactive material from un-
lawful activities, it is clear that the majority of the 
activities that aim at non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, nuclear materials and sensitive nuclear 
technology contribute to nuclear security. Physical 
and information security measures at nuclear fa-
cilities and for nuclear materials also contribute 
to non-proliferation by providing detection and 
delay of and response to security events. On the 
other hand, nuclear material accountancy and con-
trol measures may supplement security measures 
through a deterrence effect. 
The Finnish regulatory system for nuclear se-
curity was audited by an IPPAS mission in 2009, 
followed by an IPPAS follow-up mission in 2012. 
One of the recommendations arising from the 
audit, namely the need for more detailed security 
requirements for minor holders of nuclear materi-
als, was in the Nuclear Materials Section’s area 
of responsibility. As a result, the new YVL Guide 
D.1 on regulatory control of nuclear safeguards 
contains more detailed security requirements for 
these minor holders. YVL Guide D.1 complements 
YVL Guides A.11 Security of a Nuclear Facility 
and A.12 Information Security Management of a 
Nuclear Facility. STUK safeguards and security 
sections are working in close co-operation to set de-
tailed requirements for all the users of nuclear en-
ergy and to verify that requirements are complied. 
This ensures that both safeguards and security in 
all use of nuclear energy are taken care of as well 
as possible and national and international require-
ments can be fulfilled.
Figure 4. The Finnish CTBT organisation.
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2 Themes of 2013
2.1 New STUK regulations
As part of the extensive reformation work on the 
YVL guides, the safeguards requirements in for-
mer YVL 6.9 and YVL 6.10 have been compiled 
while also taking into account changes in safe-
guards since the late 1990s. New areas covered 
include the obligations and measures stemming 
from the Additional Protocol for the Safeguards 
Agreement and recent developments in the area 
of nuclear safeguards. The need for the revision of 
STUK regulations was recognised when applying 
the existing regulations to the construction of the 
new reactor Olkiluoto 3. During the reformation 
work, the international reviews and stress tests 
preformed after the Fukushima accidents were 
also taken into account. The nuclear safeguards re-
quirements were addressed mainly stemming from 
the Olkiluoto 3 experiences by fitting the safe-
guards, security and safety interfaces of a new nu-
clear facility into the bidding phase. The early in-
teraction (often referred as safeguards-by-design) 
between the different disciplines (often referred 
as the 3-S concept) was included in the high-level 
YVL Guide A.1 Regulatory Oversight of Safety in 
the Use of Nuclear Energy.  The YVL Guide D.1 
Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards covers 
obligations and requirements to all users of nucle-
ar energy in all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle. All 
stakeholders will have to describe their own safe-
guards system in written form (as a nuclear mate-
rials handbook or safeguards manual) to ease their 
task of fulfilling their obligations and to guarantee 
the effective and comprehensive function of the na-
tional safeguards system. In the new guide, there 
are also specific national requirements for the final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The YVL Guide D.1 
on nuclear safeguards was issued together with 
the other STUK regulations on 15 November and 
entered into force on 1 December 2013. The stake-
holders are requested to review their safeguards 
procedures during 2014.
2.2  Declarations on research and 
development activities
The continuous improvement of nuclear safety is 
one key requirement in Finnish nuclear legisla-
tion. The utilities are required to analyse their 
experiences and to contribute to research and de-
velopment work. Any kind of applied research into 
nuclear safety would not be possible without foun-
dations built upon the continuous existence and 
development of basic research in the field.
The fuel cycle-related research and develop-
ment	 (R&D)	work	 in	Finland	has	 lately	been	ad-
dressed by the IAEA. The IAEA and STUK have 
had a different interpretation of the requirements 
to	 report	 state-financed	 R&D	work	 as	 defined	 in	
the Additional Protocol.  The issue has been being 
discussed for the past ten years between various 
parties at the IAEA and STUK.  It was recognised 
with the IAEA before the provision of the initial 
declarations under AP in 2004 after the careful 
analysis	of	R&D	projects	at	the	Technical	Research	
Centre of Finland that most of the nuclear-related 
research is financed by the utilities and thus not a 
subject of declaration under the AP 2a(i). The state 
is financing the basic and scientific research to 
support the improved maintenance of the nuclear 
facilities that is also excluded from the declara-
tions.  As agreed ten years ago for transparency 
reasons,	the	two	major	nuclear	R&D	programmes	–	
the National Research Programme on NPP Safety 
(SAFIR) and the National Research Programme on 
the Nuclear Waste Management (KYT) have been 
declared under Article 2a(x) in order to provide the 
IAEA with information about research activities 
that are required in legislation.
During 2012 and 2013, the IAEA contacted 
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STUK about Finnish participations in current in-
ternational co-operation projects that are declared 
only by some participating states. In summer 2013, 
STUK contacted research organisations participat-
ing in those projects indicated by the IAEA. STUK 
replied in a letter and expressed concern about the 
uncertainty concerning how to declare internation-
al	 nuclear	 fuel	 cycle-related	R&D,	which	 reviews	
challenges to harmonise the declarations for large 
projects that are authorised and financed by, for 
example, the EU or OECD, not the state itself. The 
role of the national support may vary from state 
to state and also the scope of research in different 
countries and participants. In addition to this, the 
IAEA pointed out that the on-going projects are not 
to be declared under 2a(x) as a long term plan, but 
under 2a(i), thus the Finnish declarations are to be 
revised in 2014.
2.3 Licensing 
Licensing is a key element of regulatory control 
in nuclear safeguards. According to the Nuclear 
Energy Act, the use of nuclear energy is prohibited 
without a licence. A licence is required for nuclear 
facilities and for the possession, production, manu-
facture, transfer, handling, use, storage and import 
of nuclear material and for the possession, transfer 
and import of non-nuclear material, components, 
equipment and technology suitable for producing 
nuclear energy (nuclear dual-use items) as well 
as for mining and milling activities for producing 
uranium or thorium. The licensing body is STUK. 
The research and development work is excluded 
from licensing, but the stakeholders are required 
to report annually to STUK.
In 2013 an internal audit was carried out to 
evaluate the licence procedure of nuclear material 
and other nuclear dual-use items. The main find-
ings were that more experts should be involved in 
the procedure and their responsibilities should be 
clearly determined. The new experts should also 
be trained properly. The relevant guide should be 
updated to include the handling of confidential in-
formation and make the text more specific.  
2.4 Introduction of remote 
data transmission
Remote Data Transmission (RDT) means unat-
tended transmission of information generated by 
IAEA containment and/or surveillance or meas-
urement devices from the facilities to the IAEA 
headquarters. The IAEA right to use the attended 
and unattended transmission of information is 
based on the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards 
Agreement. This also stipulates the IAEA right 
to make use of internationally established sys-
tems of direct communication. Details of the im-
plementation shall be specified in the Subsidiary 
Arrangements and at facility level in the Facility 
Attachments. 
STUK was informed about IAEA’s interest in 
having RDT in use in Finland in October 2010 
during IAEA director Muroya’s visit Finland. The 
first official meeting with all the counterparts (the 
IAEA, European Commission, STUK and facilities) 
was held in Helsinki in May 2011. After this meet-
ing, official letters to implement RDT in Finnish 
facilities were received from the IAEA and the 
Commission. It was soon noticed that implemen-
tation of RDT is not only a matter of safeguards, 
but also that safety and security measures must 
be taken care of in the proper manner. Therefore, 
STUK submitted a letter to the IAEA and EC in 
January 2013 in order to take into account the 
national 3S approach and requirements set for the 
facilities while implementing RDT. Consequently, 
the IAEA-EC-STUK-facilities meeting in which 
facilities security persons were also requested to 
participate and present their concerns was held in 
June 2013. It is expected that all necessary steps 
and tasks concerning the use of RDT will be com-
pleted and RDT can be implemented in the Finnish 
facilities in 2014.
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3 Safeguards activities in 2013
3.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures as in the past. Nuclear material inventories 
at the end of 2012 are shown in Tables 2 and 3 in 
Appendix 1. The development of inspections and 
inspection person days per Material Balance Area 
(MBA) is presented in Figures 5 and 6. Inspections 
by STUK, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the European Commission in 2013 are 
presented in Appendix 2.
The application of integrated safeguards began 
in Finland on 15 October 2008. Thus, in 2009 the 
number of IAEA inspections was reduced from 
approximately 30 person days to 15. Similarly, 
the Commission reduced its inspection activities 
significantly. In 2010, the number of inspection 
days rose somewhat due to the first inspections at 
the geological repository site, additional inspection 
days at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
and the increased number of random inspections 
in Finland. Since 2010, the number of regular in-
spections has remained at the same level, i.e. the 
current number of annual IAEA inspection days is 
around 25 person days in Finland. 
Figure 5. The number of inspections from 2004 to 2013.
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3.1.1 Declarations and approvals of 
new international inspectors
All the relevant licence holders sent their updated 
information for the national declaration, which is 
compiled by STUK, in time by 1 April Regulatory 
Control of Nuclear Safeguards 2013. STUK sub-
mitted Finland’s annual declaration updates to the 
IAEA on 15 May 2013 as required. Additionally, 
STUK submitted the quarterly declarations on ex-
ports in February, May, August and November.
In 2013, altogether 15 IAEA and 12 Commission 
new inspectors were approved to perform inspec-
tions at nuclear facilities in Finland.
3.1.2 The Loviisa nuclear power plant site
In 2013, STUK granted the operating company 
Fortum two import licences for a device used in a 
nuclear reactor.
The routine refuelling outage of the Loviisa 1 
reactor unit, took place in the period 18 August–6 
September 2013, and the outage of the Loviisa 2 re-
actor unit in the period 7–13 September 2013. The 
IAEA and the Commission performed a Physical 
Inventory Taking (pre-PIT) inspection with 
STUK before the outage, on 13–14 August 2013. 
Temporary surveillance cameras were installed 
in the reactor halls for the outage period, and re-
moved during the Physical Inventory Verification 
(PIV) carried out after the outage, on 2–3 October 
2013. During the outage and before the closing of 
each reactor, STUK identified the fuel assemblies 
in the reactor cores and item counted fuel assem-
blies in the loading ponds. The Loviisa 1 core was 
inspected on 25 August 2013 and the Loviisa 2 core 
on 15 September 2013. In addition to the PIV and 
the core controls, STUK carried out one routine 
inspection and the IAEA one unannounced inspec-
tion (UI) at the spent fuel storage and, together 
with the Commission, one short-noticed random 
inspection (SNRI) at Unit 2 and the fresh fuel stor-
age. STUK attended both these inspections. Both 
Loviisa units experienced maintenance outages 
due to control rod problems and, because there 
was a possibility that the plant would have needed 
to transfer fuel during one of these outages, the 
IAEA, the Commission and STUK performed two 
extra inspections on 16–17 October 2013 and 12 
November 2013. On the basis of its own assess-
ment as well as that of the IAEA and Commission 
inspection results, STUK concluded that Fortum’s 
Loviisa NPP complied with its nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2013.
3.1.3 The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant site
In 2013, STUK granted to TVO eight import li-
cences, and two import and possession licences. 
These covered the import of fresh nuclear fuel and 
nuclear dual-use items, i.e. technology and instru-
Figure 6. Inspection person days from 2004 to 2013.
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mentation for the operating units and equipment 
for the new units under construction and design. 
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor unit took place in the period 
12 May–20 May 2013 and that of the Olkiluoto 2 
reactor unit in the period 26 May–14 June 2013. 
The PIV was carried out after the outage on 18– 
19 June 2013 in the two reactor units. The spent 
fuel storage PIV was carried out separately on 15 
August.
During the refuelling and maintenance out-
age, STUK identified the fuel assemblies in the 
reactor cores and verified and item counted in the 
loading ponds before the reactors were closed. The 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor was inspected on 17 May 2013 
and the Olkiluoto 2 reactor on 9 June 2013.
STUK carried out two additional routine in-
spections at the Olkiluoto site and the material 
balance areas (MBA) at the Olkiluoto NPP.  For the 
first time since the beginning of the spent fuel stor-
age enlargement project in 2010, spent fuel was 
transferred from the reactor buildings to the spent 
fuel storage in autumn 2013. During the enlarge-
ment project the spent fuel ponds were covered 
and the containment and surveillance measures 
were applied to ensure the continuity of knowledge 
(Figure 7).
 Design information verification inspection in 
the Olkiluoto 3 unit was carried out together with 
a surveillance meeting for follow-up of the contain-
ment and surveillance instrumentation plans on 
site. 
TVO submitted the preliminary BTC to the 
Commission on 1 November 2012 and proposed 
the MBA code W0L4 for the new unit. This was 
confirmed by the Commission on 8 January 2013 
although the decision for the reactor type and the 
vendor organisation is still pending. During 2013, 
the precautions for the information security for the 
licensed documents and data for the new unit were 
regulated.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as the 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP complied with 
its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2013.
Figure 7. The Olkiluoto spent fuel storage after enlargement (courtesy of  TVO).
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3.1.4 The Hanhikivi nuclear 
power plant project
The Government approved a Decisions-in-Principle 
in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to con-
struct a new nuclear power plant at a new site. 
The applicant was requested to submit its nuclear 
construction licence application within 5 years and 
to submit a plan for its nuclear waste management 
within 6 years. In 2011, Fennovoima announced 
its decision to build the new nuclear power plant 
on Hanhikivi peninsula in Pyhäjoki.  STUK ini-
tiated negotiations with the operators and the 
Commission and the IAEA in 2011 to prepare for 
the implementation of safeguards in good time, 
together with the facility development. As a con-
sequence, the company could request the vendor 
organisations to facilitate safeguards implemen-
tation, for example to improve proliferation re-
sistance, and to facilitate nuclear material veri-
fication and surveillance at the future plant. In 
2011, Fennovoima submitted invitations to tender 
to Areva and Toshiba and the bids were received 
in January 2012. However, in 2013 Fennovoima 
announced that it had decided to continue bid 
discussions only with Rosatom, and finally on 21 
December 2013 Fennovoima announced that the 
supply contract would be signed with Rusatom 
Overseas CJSC. In the meantime, Fennovoima cre-
ated an organisation for safeguards and prepared 
for the implementation of safeguards. 
One of the first steps in the construction process 
is the control of nuclear technology, such as sensi-
tive information obtained from the bidding compa-
nies. During 2013, STUK granted to Fennovoima 
one licence for the import and possession of nuclear 
technology and another license to transfer that 
technology. The nuclear materials handbook is 
under preparation. STUK and Fennovoima met in 
October 2013 and discussed the draft version that 
is focused on the current needs to control the nu-
clear technology and dual-use equipment.
Fennovoima submitted the preliminary de-
sign information about the new facility to the 
Commission on 5 July 2013. The Commission as-
signed MBA code WFV1 to the Fennovoima facility 
on 2 October 2013. Fennovoima’s site declaration 
is expected to be prepared and submitted within 
the progress of the project. The master plan for the 
land use in Pyhäjoki municipality was revised in 
2013 to allow nuclear construction in the future. 
As the option of having Rosatom as a vendor can-
didate was not included in the application ratified 
in 2010, the re-assessment of the already approved 
application begun in 2013 for technical and or-
ganisational had changed since the Decision-in-
Principle. From the safeguards point of view, the 
safeguards procedures have improved and impor-
tant experience has been gained at the new stake-
holder during the bidding phase. 
Based on the meetings on the implementation 
of safeguards and the control of nuclear technol-
ogy with Fennovoima’s staff, STUK concludes that 
awareness and preparedness for safeguards proce-
dures are at an adequate level in the new organisa-
tion preparing for the new project.
3.1.5 The VTT FiR1 research reactor site
In 2013, there were two major changes at the 
Technical Research Centre of Finland, VTT. The 
preparations for decommissioning the research 
reactor and those for the new nuclear safety cen-
tre building continued. STUK reviewed the plans 
for safety, security and safeguards arrangements 
and made two statements to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. In the meanwhile, 
the responsible person for nuclear materials ac-
countancy retired in summer 2013 and STUK ap-
proved the successor and his deputy during the 
year.
In 2013 STUK carried out three interim in-
spections to the research reactor site of VTT. The 
nuclear material accountancy, site declaration and 
activities and internal control systems were re-
viewed on 7 February 2013 by STUK. Owing to 
some minor inconsistencies in the accountancy, 
STUK and the European Commission carried out 
an additional inspection on 27 February 2013. 
STUK and the Commission verified the nuclear 
material inventory of VTT on 1 October 2013. The 
nuclear material inventory was concluded to be 
correct during the inspection. After the inspection, 
the reporting of small amounts and exchanges of 
small samples between research organisations was 
addressed by STUK and the Commission.
On 4 September 2013 STUK’s and VTT’s re-
sponsible persons met and discussed future actions 
to ensure appropriate safeguards procedures for 
the future. As a consequence, the joint nuclear 
history of the university and the research centre 
in Otaniemi, and the current possession and loca-
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tion of old reactor fuel including reactor graphite 
were reviewed. The supply chain and safeguards 
requirements for the nuclear building were also 
discussed. These projects highlight how safeguards 
implementation requires continuous communica-
tion between the regulator, the operator and the 
other stakeholders in the nuclear fuel cycle. The 
procedures for continuous exchange of information 
and training for the newly appointed safeguards 
staff were agreed.
3.1.6 The STUK site
STUK Nuclear Materials Section verified the 
physical inventory, and inspected the site decla-
ration and basic technical characteristics during 
the inspection on 4 October 2013. In addition, the 
KMP C of STUK located in central Finland was 
inspected by STUK Radiation Practices Regulation 
on 4 November 2013 as a user radioactive mate-
rial. Thus, it can be concluded that the operating 
unit at STUK fulfils the requirements for national 
safeguards arrangements. 
3.1.7 The University of Helsinki site
STUK carried out its inspection to the University 
of Helsinki site on 28 November 2013 to verify the 
site declaration and the inventory.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the University of 
Helsinki complied with its nuclear safeguards obli-
gations in 2013.
3.1.8 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2013, a few STUK inspections were focused on 
the minor nuclear material holders in order to en-
sure that the capabilities and procedures are ad-
equate. As a routine, STUK inspected the reports 
from the minor nuclear material holders, and three 
inspections at their premises were carried out. In 
2013, two new minor holders reported their ac-
tivities, and one holder reported the termination of 
possession of nuclear material.   
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the minor nuclear 
material holders complied with their nuclear safe-
guards obligations in 2013.
3.1.9 Front-end fuel cycle operators
The operators at Harjavalta and Kokkola are re-
porting monthly to the Commission and STUK. 
The extraction of uranium from industrial pu-
rification processes is considered to be pre-safe-
guards activities and therefore not under IAEA 
safeguards. With the entry into force of the YVL 
Guide D.1 imminent, the operators are preparing 
their procedures to fulfil the new requirements. 
In particular, the nuclear safeguards manual are 
to be incorporated into the quality managements 
systems. During the year 2013, STUK reviewed the 
draft versions of the manuals prepared by Norilsk 
Nickel Harjavalta and Talvivaara Sotkamo.
During early 2011, STUK evaluated the li-
cence application of Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd to 
begin uranium production as a by-product at 
the Talvivaara nickel mine. On 1 March 2012, 
the Finnish government granted a licence in ac-
cordance with the Finnish nuclear legislation to 
Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd for the extraction of ura-
nium from the Talvivaara mine. According to the 
licence conditions, STUK must ensure that all rel-
evant arrangements are in place, including the nu-
clear safeguards manual and responsible persons 
for nuclear materials accountancy before the plant 
is commissioned. During 2011–2013 the uranium 
extraction plant was built as a new unit in the 
mineral processing complex. Progress in uranium 
extraction was halted on 5 December 2013 when 
the Supreme Administrative Court revoked the 
permit of 1 March 2012 to extract uranium for re-
assessment by the Finnish government. According 
to the Supreme Administrative Court, there were 
several changes in the operations of Talvivaara 
Sotkamo Ltd following the permit decision, includ-
ing corporate reorganisation. Before the ruling, the 
government must reassess the permit application 
documentation and, if needed, obtain additional 
information on the economical and safety-related 
requirements set forth in the Nuclear Energy Act.
3.1.10 The final disposal facility site 
for spent nuclear fuel
After the submission of the nuclear construction 
licence application in 2012, several meetings were 
arranged between STUK, the Commission and the 
IAEA during 2013 in order to clarify and facili-
tate safeguards measures for the final disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel. These meetings focused on the 
verification issues prior to spent fuel encapsula-
tion. This issue was discussed in Luxembourg on 
STUK-B 173
29
19 November 2013 with Posiva’s design managers, 
because it is important that designers are aware of 
the safeguards measures to be adapted at the facil-
ity at an early phase of facility development. Also 
the technical measures needed for the verification 
of the underground premises were addressed in the 
inspection of the preliminary BTC documents on 5 
June 2013. In order to clarify the inspection pro-
cedures in the future repository, on 17 June 2013 
STUK sent a letter to the IAEA with an official 
invitation to discuss the details.  Posiva submitted 
the Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) on 27 
June 2013, and the underground premises were 
confirmed to correspond to the drawing in the BTC 
document and the excavation drawings available at 
the site during the Design Information Verification 
inspection carried out on 3–4 December 2013, al-
though no response to the June letter was received. 
During 2013, STUK carried out two interim in-
spections at the underground premises. 
3.1.11 Verification of spent fuel 
In 2013, STUK’s efforts in non-destructive assay 
(NDA) were concentrated on testing the prototype 
of a Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) 
device (Figure 8). The PGET is designed to be able 
to detect even single-pin diversions from spent nu-
clear fuel. The PGET technology is a strong can-
didate for the NDA verification of spent nuclear 
fuel before the fuel is placed in the final reposi-
tory. There is a special need for good verification at 
that stage, as the fuel becomes impossible to reach 
for verification once it has been deposited deep in 
the bedrock. One successful test was performed at 
the Olkiluoto NPP, where five fuel elements were 
measured with promising results. The small num-
ber of elements was due to technical inefficiencies 
in the electronics of the prototype device, which 
leads to measuring times that are tens of times 
longer than would be achieved with a more devel-
oped version. In addition to STUK and TVO staff, 
technical experts on the device and observers from 
the IAEA and the Commission participated in the 
campaign. All measured fuel elements were veri-
fied to hold spent nuclear fuel in a pin configura-
tion corresponding to operator data. Water single 
pins were clearly visible from the produced images, 
and water channels detected (Figure 9).  The test 
at Olkiluoto showed that the detection capability of 
this device far exceeds any NDA methods currently 
in use by the IAEA. 
The Olkiluoto test measurements showed 
some technical problems of the prototype PGET, 
that where resolved during the autumn of 2013. 
Because of this, the NDA measurement campaign 
planned at the Loviisa site was delayed until 
January 2014. 
Figure 8. The PGET device in the pond at Olkiluoto NPP 
with a fuel element in the measurement position.
Figure 9. 8x8 fuel element with a single pin-sized water 
channel, as imaged with the PGET device during the 
Olkiluoto campaign.
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3.1.12 Nuclear dual-use items, export licences
In 2013, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 
18 export licences for NSG part 1 items: six li-
cences for exporting nuclear process modelling 
software to China, Croatia, Germany (2), Hungary 
and Slovakia, two individual licences to France 
and Germany and 10 global licences for exporting 
nuclear technology (nuclear information) for a nu-
clear power plant. 
3.1.13 Transport of nuclear materials 
and nuclear waste
In 2013, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland 
from Germany, Sweden and the Russian Federation 
(Table 1). In relation to these imports, STUK ap-
proved three transport plans and three transport 
package designs. Furthermore, STUK granted one 
certificate for non-objection for nuclear shipping. 
In addition, STUK approved plans and permits for 
transport with specific arrangements in category 
7 materials and nuclear waste treatment outside 
Finland.
STUK inspected fresh nuclear fuel transports 
according to inspection plan (two inspections). The 
inspections were performed in cooperation with the 
police. In late 2013, on the request of the Defence 
Forces, STUK participated in one joint preparatory 
meeting related to nuclear waste transport vessel 
safety. 
3.1.14 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2013, TVO reported to STUK about its interna-
tional fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel ship-
ments. STUK carried out an on-site inspection 
where TVO’s nuclear material accountancy on the 
fresh fuel imported in 2013 was verified against 
the original shipment documents, which cover in-
ternational transfers. The accountancy of the natu-
ral uranium in TVO’s possession but stored out-
side the Olkiluoto NPP site was also inspected. 
Based on the findings, STUK concluded that TVO 
has complied with its safeguards obligations when 
purchasing the nuclear fuel and managing its in-
ternational nuclear material transfers. The other 
operators purchase fuel as an end-product and 
thus their accountancy does not need to cover the 
purchase chain abroad.
3.2 The Finnish National Data 
Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
3.2.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
During 2013, the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WGB is a policy-making 
organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise 
to the CTBTO, while also attending to Finnish na-
tional interests. 
3.2.2 The analysis pipeline is a well-
established daily routine
The FiNDC continued developing its own moni-
toring system for the data received from the 
International Monitoring System’s network (IMS). 
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The IMS network 
is still developing, and the number of installed air 
filter stations was 66 at the end of 2013 (in the fi-
nal stage there will be 80). The analysis pipeline is 
linked to the LINSSI database and equipped with 
an automated alarm system, to enable efficient and 
fully automated screening of the data.
The number of IMS stations equipped with ra-
dioxenon measurement capabilities was 30 at the 
end of 2013. 18 IMS radioxenon systems were certi-
fied by the CTBTO at the end of 2013. Radioxenon 
measurements are especially important for CTBT 
verification, because xenon, as a noble gas, may 
also leak from underground tests, which seldom 
release particulate matter. The operatingonal sta-
tions generated more than 1000 gamma and beta-
gamma spectra per day for the FiNDC analysis 
pipeline to handle. The particulate pipeline is well-
established and has been running stably for many 
years, while FiNDC still needs some refinement of 
its xenon analysis capabilities.
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3.2.3 The DPRK nuclear test
North Korea performed its third underground nu-
clear test at 02:58 (UTC) on 12 February 2013. As 
with the previous tests, the signal was immedi-
ately picked up by the seismic monitoring network 
of the CTBTO. Within two hours of the event, the 
Executive Secretary of the CTBTO sent out a press 
release, and shortly thereafter the Institute of 
Seismology provided its preliminary analysis of the 
event. In the initial phase of an event like this, the 
main role of the FiNDC is to gather information 
and provide assessments of the situation to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affaires and other affiliations.
In early April about 50 days after the tests, 
radioxenon was measured in Japan, with 
characteristics that did not fit well with what is 
normally measured at the station. Careful analysis 
of gas composition and atmospheric transport 
indicates a fair probability that the measured 
xenon originated from a very late release of gases 
from the February test. 
3.3 International co-operation 
The implementation of safeguards in Finland was 
addressed at several meetings with the IAEA and 
the Commission. In addition, STUK continued its 
participation in the ESARDA working groups, ex-
ecutive board and the steering committee meet-
ings. The head of STUK’s Security Technology 
Laboratory continued his term as the chairper-
son of the ESARDA Novel Approaches/Novel 
Technologies Working Group. A STUK expert was 
invited to the IAEA SSAC course organised by 
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee in 
the USA. The IAEA organised the workshop on 
synergies between safety, security and safeguards 
especially for the nuclear newcomer states, and the 
STUK expert recounted experiences of existing and 
new Finnish nuclear programmes. STUK experts 
also made many presentations at the INMM an-
nual meeting. The contributions by STUK experts 
were highly recognised in international fora.
 The progress at the Olkiluoto 3 unit, which has 
been under construction since 2003, and the more 
current authorisation of the new nuclear facilities 
in 2010 have given STUK practical experience in 
implementing safety, security and safeguards for 
new nuclear facilities. Owing to this, STUK experts 
have been invited on several occasions to present 
guidance and share their experiences. Some of 
this activity has been facilitated via the Finnish 
Support Programme to the IAEA, but there have 
also been other mechanisms available to contrib-
ute to the worldwide co-operation. In addition, the 
new facilities at the front- and back-ends of the 
fuel cycle, i.e. the extraction of uranium in mining 
and milling and the development of the geological 
repository, have widened the capabilities and scope 
of the Finnish national safeguards system.
Finland’s bilateral cooperation programmes in 
the area of non-proliferation are directed mainly 
towards our neighbouring countries outside the 
EU and are motivated by the continued need 
to enhance the regional security environment. 
Accordingly, STUK continued its cooperation pro-
gramme with the Russian Federation. The ac-
tivities in the action plan for 2013 agreed be-
tween STUK and Rostechnadzor and as relevant 
to the material control and accountancy and to 
physical protection were not undertaken during 
2013 due to other priorities occupying the re-
sources of both parties. Collaboration with Ukraine 
in mutually beneficial areas was re-established 
in 2008 and an agreement about a programme 
was made between STUK and the State Nuclear 
Regulatory Committee of Ukraine, since 2011 the 
State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine 
(SNRIU). As per this agreement, capacity building 
at the SNRIU was continued in 2013. 
3.3.1 Support programme to the IAEA
The Finnish Support Programme (FINSP) is fi-
nanced by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
coordinated by STUK. The FINSP was established 
in May 1998, and celebrated its 25th anniversary 
in 2013. The history of FINSP was described at 
the INMM meeting in 2013. The total cumulative 
budget over these 25 years is approaching €10M. 
Politically, the FINSP can be seen as a support 
to the NPT verification regime and as a demonstra-
tion of strong commitment to non-proliferation. 
Signing NPT and the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement means an engagement to an under-
taking, to cooperate in order to enable efficient 
implementation of the IAEA safeguards system. 
A State Support Programme is an excellent vol-
untary mechanism to that end. However, from the 
technical point of view, FINSP helps the IAEA to 
develop its safeguards concepts and technologies. 
Many of FINSP tasks are joint tasks. Work 
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is done in collaboration with the other Member 
States’ support programmes and their experts 
and also the experts of the IAEA. Their fruitful 
cooperation and participation in joint tasks is ac-
knowledged. 
FINSP has a light administration structure but 
a network of experts at its disposal. These experts 
come from STUK, research institutions and uni-
versities and from the private sector. The FINSP 
funding does not allow initiating new projects 
and tasks easily, but FINSP is in the process of 
learning how to use other funding instruments to 
support	 the	R&D	needs	 for	 the	IAEA	safeguards.	
FINSP will take a more coordinating and facilitat-
ing role in the future. 
The most demanding task in recent years has 
been the JNT A 1510 Proto-type Tomographic 
Spent Fuel Detector System. Its goal is to develop 
a passive gamma emission tomographic verifier. 
In 2012–2014 three successful campaigns were 
conducted. The first was held in Ispra in June 
2012, the second in Olkiluoto in March 2013 and 
the third in Loviisa in Jan 2014. It has now been 
shown that the prototype system is able to gener-
ate a cross-sectional activity map of a spent fuel 
item and is able to detect a single missing pin in-
side a VVER-440 fuel assembly. 
Another task worth mentioning is the 
Newcomers Task: FIN B 1939, Support for 
Newcomers States Pursuing a Nuclear Power 
Programme. Many new states want to join the 
“Nuclear Family” and are planning their nuclear 
power programmes. For the IAEA safeguards, this 
is a challenge and source of extra workload. Under 
the task B 1939, Finland provides peer support 
to the newcomers and tries to provide answers to 
their practical questions. Our experiences are rel-
evant, because in Finland there are nuclear power 
reactor construction projects going on. Regulatory 
Authority STUK and nuclear operators are all 
involved in the task and in the issues of Nuclear 
Safety and Security in the internal workshops. 
However, “One size does not fit all” and replicat-
ing Finnish system all around the globe as such is 
most likely not the correct solution. What FINSP 
can do is to show how the operator-authority inter-
face works in Finland. 
FINSP has also been busy organising NDA 
training for the IAEA inspectors. A Spent Fuel 
Verification Training Course was held in Loviisa 
NPP on 28–31 Oct 2013.
FINSP also supports developing new and nov-
el technologies for the IAEA safeguards. Remote 
Alfa-detection is one promising technique, which 
may also have Safety and Security applications. 
In December 2013, a measurement campaign was 
organised in JRC, Karlsruhe in collaboration with 
the European Commission Support Programme. 
FINSP also looks closely at how indoor navigation 
technologies are developing. Finland has many 
industrial and institutional research groups, which 
are active in this area.
3.3.2 Final disposal programme 
and the ASTOR group
The programmes for a geological repository for 
spent nuclear fuel in Sweden and Finland have 
reached the licensing phase, and the safeguards 
measures must be agreed to by all parties: facility 
designers, operators and the inspectorates. Thus, 
the IAEA and the Commission presented their 
safeguards approaches at the last Application of 
Safeguards to Geological Repositories (ASTOR) 
group’s meetings. In 2013, the group of experts 
met in Pori and Olkiluoto on 3–5 June.  There were 
almost 50 participants attending the meeting and 
an excursion to the Olkiluoto geological repository 
was organised. The next ASTOR meeting will be 
hosted by Sweden in 2014.
A new task force consisting of the IAEA, the 
Commission and Finnish and Swedish authorities 
and operators was established at the 2012 ASTOR 
meeting. The first Lower Level Liaison Committee 
(LLLC) Encapsulation Plant and Geological 
Repository (EPGR) Liaison Group meeting was 
scheduled for January 2013 to discuss the draft 
versions for Basic Technical  Characteristics of the 
encapsulation plant and the geological repository. 
The Committee did meet officially during 2013, but 
IAEA and the Commission representatives com-
mented on the preparation of the BTC documents 
during spring 2013 as described in Item 3.1.10.
3.3.3  Cooperation with the 
Rostechnadzor, Russia
Cooperation between Finnish and Russian authori-
ties, technical support organisations, industrial 
partners and the status of the cooperation pro-
gramme were reviewed at the meeting in July. The 
demonstration of the spent fuel attribute tester 
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(SFAT) measurement device for the Rostechnadzor 
was successfully carried out in 2008 at the Kola 
nuclear power plant. Since then a new comput-
er has been obtained for the system, software in-
stalled and further steps taken to organise the 
shipment to the Ozersk Office of the Rostechnadzor 
in 2012. The SFAT was delivered from STUK for 
use by the inspectors of the Ural Regional Office at 
Mayak (in January 2014). To successfully complete 
the project, STUK is ready to provide training for 
Russian inspectors and operators in PO Mayak in 
the use of SFAT. This bilateral work complements 
the work done within the EU-financed TACIS pro-
ject, which aims at improving the supervision and 
control of the handling of nuclear materials at the 
Mayak reprocessing plant.
During 2013, the planning of two seminars 
continued: one on transport aimed at enhanc-
ing control of radiation-contaminated scrap metal 
consignments and the other at knowledge-sharing 
on maritime transportation of nuclear and other 
radioactive materials in the Baltic Sea region. In 
addition planning continues on sharing experience 
in issues related to nuclear security during major 
public events. STUK announced its collaboration 
project between national authorities for establish-
ing and implementing a national nuclear security. 
A short public brochure about this project has been 
made available for Rostechnadzor for information. 
3.3.4  Capacity building in Ukraine
From 2009 to 2010, the focus of the programme 
with Ukraine was on manufacturing and deliver-
ing a mobile laboratory vehicle for the use of the 
State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine 
(SNRIU). The mobile measuring laboratory called 
Sophisticated ON-site Nuclide Identification 
(SONNI) enables the identification and analysis 
of radioactive sources and nuclear materials in the 
environment, at industrial facilities and in cases 
of threatening situations. The laboratory includes 
measuring, sampling, positioning and communica-
tion systems. Data can be transmitted in real time 
to the control centre, where it can be entered into a 
map system, thus providing real-time information 
for the management of the operations. At loca-
tions where the vehicle cannot have access, a port-
able application with the same functionality can be 
used. The capacity building in this area is financed 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
The modern radiation measuring vehicle to-
gether with the portable application unit was do-
nated to the IAEA and further to SNRIU in Kiev 
in December 2010. Two one-week long educational 
sessions were organised in autumn 2011 to train 
the new crews and a field exercise was conducted 
in December 2011. The work continued during 
2012 and 2013 with field exercises and the provi-
sioning of additional equipment and measurement 
devices. As continuation to this training, a new pro-
ject was approved by the Commission to strength-
en SNRIU’s capabilities to provide independent 
radiation monitoring using the mobile laboratory. 
The practical exercises in 2013 focused on territo-
ries with medical institutions that use radiation 
and nuclear technologies, and around uranium 
mining and milling facilities. Special emphasis was 
given to the use of the mobile laboratory as part of 
normal regulatory activities.
In addition, another EU project was imple-
mented to enhance border control functions by 
provisioning conventional radiation detectors and 
new technical means for protection against chemi-
cal, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
threats. At the selected border stations between 
Poland and Ukraine, training was arranged for 
border control officers in November 2012. This EU 
funded project was completed during 2013 and all 
equipment is certified for official use by the au-
thorities. 
3.4 Radiation monitoring at 
border crossing stations
STUK and Finnish Customs have a joint project 
for the radiation border monitoring of Finnish bor-
der crossing stations. Upgrading project RADAR 
continues until 2014. In 2013, the ports of Kotka 
and Hamina were equipped with radiation portals. 
Border monitoring has several aims: it helps to 
find sources, which are out of regulatory control, 
and is also a part of the detection architecture 
combating the illicit trafficking of radioactive and 
nuclear materials, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and nuclear terrorism. 
STUK was also involved in the development of 
nuclear detection architecture together with other 
authorities like customs, the police, border guard, 
etc. This also has an international dimension in the 
Baltic region as described above in Item 3.3.3.
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4 Human resources development
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and many other activi-
ties besides. The nuclear fuel cycle-related activi-
ties such as research and development activities 
not involving nuclear material or the manufacture 
of certain equipment as defined in the Additional 
Protocol have extended the scope of traditional 
safeguards. Nuclear safeguards on the national 
level are closely linked with the other functions 
of nuclear materials control and non-proliferation: 
licensing, export control, border control, transport 
control, combating illicit trafficking, the physical 
protection of nuclear materials and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT). The continuous analysis of the 
developments in the involved fields of both technol-
ogy and politics is a daily, multidisciplinary task 
at the STUK Nuclear Materials Section. Most of 
the experts working in Nuclear Materials Sections 
have also been reserved to work for STUK’s 
Emergency Preparedness in case of emergency. 
That is a good overall view of the whole scale work 
of STUK, and continuous training keeps experts in 
touch.
The personnel’s competence is systematically 
developed, taking into account the needs of the 
organisation and the wishes of individuals. Those 
aiming at an expert’s career are valued as highly 
as those interested in managerial duties. In 2013, 
one of the staff members finalised his participation 
in the specialist qualification for management and 
leadership organised for state officials. The partici-
pants came from the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health and agencies under its supervision. Most of 
the education and training to develop management 
and leadership skills took place at the workplace. 
One of the inspectors attended the Euratom train-
ing course on European Nuclear Safeguards in 
Luxembourg. Nuclear material section has devel-
oped its activities in workshops. In 2013, one work-
shop was held on an effective and healthy working 
community.
STUK launched a new strategy in 2013 and be-
gan the implementation of the consequent matrix 
organisation.  It is not always easy to work in a 
matrix, having many task managers and supervi-
sors besides the line organisation responsible for 
resources and financing, and having the aim of 
making fences as low as possible between each of 
the units. In the Nuclear Materials Section, in spite 
of the reduced resources during the reorganisation, 
there exists quite good knowledge about the work 
in the other units and departments, one benefit of 
participating in the emergency preparedness and 
other common duties done by STUK. Thus, when 
implementing the new strategy, it is important to 
start a new kind of cooperation with other STUK 
units to optimise the use of skills and resources.
The forming of a support group for the Nuclear 
Materials Section was one new aspect of coop-
eration in 2013.  The group provides the head 
of the Section with information and knowledge 
gathered by the group members during the years 
they have spent working in other organisations 
like the IAEA.  This enables discussion of impor-
tant questions from different perspectives. The 
support group members are the directors of the 
Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation and four 
senior experts from different organisational units 
of STUK. The group meets once a month with a 
specific agenda set beforehand, or with an acute 
issue requiring immediate action. The arrange-
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ment also aims at competence-sharing not only in 
the Nuclear Materials Sections but also within the 
group itself.
The cooperation with other units is based on 
exchange of information, and consequent motiva-
tion and training. The Nuclear Materials Section 
held meetings with other STUK units to allocate 
synergies and activities which might be imple-
mented in cooperation. There are several activities 
rationale to start immediately. For example, the 
spent fuel verification measurements are in the 
current organisation carried out by the staff of 
Environmental Radiation Surveillance. In this unit 
there are experts on measurements and analysis, 
and they also play an important role in Emergency 
Preparedness because they prepare estimations of 
how the radioactivity from a reactor will disperse. 
It is also a challenge for them get familiar with the 
fuel and nuclear power plants. In addition, STUK 
Radiation Practices Regulation carries out regular 
inspections of organisations that use radioactive 
sources and small amounts of nuclear materials. 
During such inspections, it is possible to make 
nuclear safeguards inspection according to the 
training and check-list pre-viewed by the Nuclear 
Materials Section. Nuclear security and safeguards 
may have different aspects to the control of nuclear 
materials. Therefore, it is necessary to have close 
cooperation between these two units. Cooperation 
and good communication between different depart-
ments and units improve nuclear safety, security 
and safeguards in general.
The distribution of the working days of the 
Nuclear Materials Section in the different duty 
areas is presented in Figure 10. Most of the work-
ing days are chargeable to the stakeholders. As 
seen in Figure 10, the duty areas are divided into 
those of direct oversight and inspections (basic 
operations), support functions including mainte-
nance, development work for the regulatory func-
tions and consultancy including e.g. international 
cooperation financed by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs or the EU, and to the RADAR project, 
which supports Finnish Customs. Organisationally 
the project was relocated in the expert services 
of the Environmental Radiation Surveillance in 
May 2013, so the percentages in Figure 10 are not 
equally accounted for the whole year. However, 
the state budgetary funding constitutes less than 
10% of the total funding of the Nuclear Materials 
Section. 
The staff of STUK Nuclear Materials Section. All section staff participate in the core safeguards tasks. 
Additionally, each person has some special areas of expertise to focus on.
Ms. Elina Martikka Section Head Management
Ms. Ritva Kylmälä Assistant 
Mr. Timo Ansaranta Inspector Control of operators’ competence at facilities, inspections, declarations
Mr. Marko Hämäläinen Senior Inspector Safeguards relation, Inspection coordination, Additional Protocol-related 
matters
Mr. Tapani Honkamaa Senior Inspector FINSP ot the IAEA safeguards
Mr. Mikael Moring Senior Inspector Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT, safeguards for final disposal
Mr. Olli Okko Senior Inspector Safeguards for geological repository, Additional Protocol-related oversight 
of R&D activities
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Figure 10.  The distribution of the working days of the Nuclear Materials Section in the different duty areas.
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5 Conclusions
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures and activities with 59 inspection days and 
41 inspections. The implementation of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inte-
grated safeguards began in Finland on 15 October 
2008.  Since 2010, the number of IAEA and 
European Commission inspections annually has 
been close to 20. The implementation of the IAEA 
integrated safeguards reduces the total number 
of annual routine inspections days of the inter-
national inspectorates, but includes short-notice 
random inspections. In order to be present at all of 
the short-notice IAEA inspections, STUK has had 
a daily on-call inspector. 
In 2012, STUK performed 27 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Finnish nuclear power plants (NPP), 
11 at the Loviisa NPP and 16 at the Olkiluoto NPP. 
The Commission and the IAEA took part in 16 of 
these inspections. The number of inspections at 
Loviisa was higher than usual due to unscheduled 
outages with precautions for possible core open-
ings. STUK performed one non-destructive assay 
measurement campaign at the Olkiluoto NPP; the 
IAEA and the Commission participated in this 
campaign as observers. In 2013, STUK carried out 
three inspections of the new minor nuclear materi-
al holders. At other facilities, the Commission took 
part in the accountancy inspection and physical 
inventory verification at the VTT research reactor, 
and together with the IAEA twice in the BTC and 
design information verifications of the geological 
repository at the final disposal site at Olkiluoto. 
The total number of safeguards inspections in 2013 
was 42 for STUK, 20 for the Commission, and 19 
for the IAEA. The IAEA sent its safeguards state-
ments to the Commission, which amended them 
with its own conclusions and forwarded them to 
STUK. The conclusions by the Commission were 
in line with the IAEA’s remarks as well as with 
STUK’s own findings; there were no outstanding 
questions by the IAEA or the Commission at the 
end of 2013.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards in-
spection activities continued to demonstrate that 
the Finnish licence holders take good care of their 
nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the licence holders’ declarations. However, the 
number of inspections at the VTT research reactor 
was higher than usually because of some discrep-
ancies in the accounting. Also the precautions for 
decommissioning and new buildings as well as the 
retirement and consequent appointments of new 
personnel responsible for safeguards increased the 
work load at this facility. Neither the IAEA nor 
the Commission made any remarks nor did they 
present any required actions based on their inspec-
tions. By their nuclear materials accountancy and 
control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK 
to fulfil its own obligations under the international 
agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards and 
non-proliferation.
In 2013, STUK’s Nuclear Materials Section 
cooperated closely with the IAEA in order to share 
experiences and train authorities’ staff in countries 
that are aiming at nuclear programmes, i.e. urani-
um production or nuclear energy. STUK cooperated 
with Finnish Customs to offer expert advice in the 
development of radiation monitoring at borders, 
including training for Customs officers.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activities 
is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach 
this goal, major steps have to be taken in the politi-
cal arena, and an important prerequisite for posi-
tive political action is that the verification system 
of the CTBTO is functioning and able to provide 
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assurance to all parties that it is impossible to 
make a clandestine nuclear test without getting 
detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role 
in the common endeavour so that the verification 
system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection 
task. While still incomplete, the verification system 
has already demonstrated its ability to detect nu-
clear tests.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement 
concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear 
(such as in “protective 
measures taken against 
CBRN weapons or hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment 
according to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with 
gross gamma and neutron 
detection
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
High-enriched uranium
HPGe
High-Purity Germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
ITU
Institute of Transuranium 
Elements in Karlsruhe
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INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, eg. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working Group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive 
materials
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEE
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission
OECD/NEA
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development /Nuclear 
Energy Agency
Onkalo
Underground rock 
characterisation facility (for 
the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel)
PIT
Physical Inventory Taking
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory 
in the CTBT IMS network 
hosted by STUK (FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRCU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission of Ukraine
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
SNRIU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Inspectorate of Ukraine
SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced 
inspection, complementary 
access, on-call inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
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UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the 
CTBTO)
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Table 1. Summary of nuclear fuel receipts in 2013.
To From FA LEU (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 Germany 110 19 168
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 Sweden 106 18 324
Loviisa NPP, WL0V Russian Federation 270 33 908
 FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium. 
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2013
Table 2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2013.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 1236/650 211 218 1022
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 1255/685 208 905 1014
Olkiluoto, spent fuel 
storage, W0LS
6761/6761 1 143 651 9609
Loviisa NPP, WL0V 5469/4 669 635 919 5752
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) Fuel assemblies (FA) in the  core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 FAs and Olkiluoto NPP 500 FAs per reactor)
Table 3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2013.
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U*) (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 211 263 – 1023 –
W0L2 – 208 951 – 1014 –
W0LS – 1 143 651 – 9609 –
WL0V – 635 920 – 5752 –
WRRF 1511 60.098 0.002 < 0.001 0.044
WFRS 0.574 0.537 369.0 ~ 0 0.199
WKK0 2709.7 – – – –
WNNH 2623.55 – – – –
WHEL 49.716 0.293 20.010 0.003 2.942
Minor holders  0.230 0.00116  1179.2 ~ 0  0.363
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT  Research Reactor, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = Freeport Cobalt Oy, in Kokkola, WNNH = Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta, WHEL = 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 IAEA, European Commission and STUK 
safeguards field activities in 2013 in Finland
General Information Inspections Inspection Person Days
MBA/Location Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
Nukliditekniikka 4 January Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 3
Avatron 23 January Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
WRRF 7 February System inspection 0 0 1 0 0 3
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 11 February Interim inspection, site check 0 0 3 0 0 3
W0LF 12 February As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 3
WL0V 13 February SNRI (LO2+Fresh fuel storage) 1 1 1 1 1 1
WRRF 27 February Accountancy verification 0 1 1 0 1 1
WL0V 28 February Interim Inspection, EC camera & 
seals maintenance only
0 1 1 0 1 1
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 7–8 May Pre-PIT 3 3 3 3 3 3
W0L1 17 May OL1 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LF 5 June BTC document inspection 1 1 1 1 2 1
W0L2 9 June OL2 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2 18–19 June PIV, BTC review 2 2 2 2 2 2
WL0V 9 July Interim inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 13–14 August Pre-PIT 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LS 15 August PIV, DIV 2 2 2 1 1 1
WL0V 25 August Lo1 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 15 September Lo2 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WRRF 1 October PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 2–3 October Post PIT, DIV 2 2 2 2 2 2
WFRS 4 October PIV, BTC verification 0 0 1 0 0 3
TVO, Helsinki 
Headquarter
16 October International NM transfers, 
accountancy and control
0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 16–17 October Ad hoc, due to unscheduled 
outage and possible core 
opening at Lo2
1 1 1 4 2 2
WFRS, KMP C (in Lakiala) 4 November Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 12 November Ad hoc, due to unscheduled 
outage and possible core 
opening at Lo2
1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L3 14 November DIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
Aalto University 21 November PIV, System inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 21 November Unannounced inspection (UI) 1 0 1 2 0 1
HYRL 28 November PIV, site check 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LF 3–4 December DIV 1 1 1 2 2 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 12 December Interim inspection 0 0 3 0 0 3
NDA MEASUREMENTS
W0L1 11–14 March PGET (also as equipment test, 
IAEA and EC as observers)
1 1 1 4 4 8
TOTAL 19 20 41 26 25 59
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CV = Core Verification, CA = 
Complementary Access, ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay.
Table 4. IAEA, Commission and STUK safeguards inspections on site.
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APPENDIX 3 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concern-
ing safeguards of nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items at the end of 2013 in Finland (Finnish 
Treaty Series, FTS):
1. The Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 
as amended.
2. The Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 
1988/161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 Septem-
ber 1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	 the	 list	 in	At-
tachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	Eur-
atom Treaty, on determining concentrations of 
ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005.
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting 
up a Community regime for the control of ex-
ports, transfer, brokering, and transit of dual-
use items.
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III 
and X expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
17. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Fin-
land on January 15, 1999, but will not enter 
into force before it is ratified by all 44 states 
listed in Annex II of the treaty.
